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Abstract
We extend the general disequilibrium model of Malinvaud (1980) by using dual
labor market theory. By considering two tiers of workers, we find that while the
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not always keep an equilibrium in the medium term. In the medium term, the business
cycle converges toward a disequilibrium regime unless the goods market is potentially
in equilibrium. Employment and wages at the steady state are affected by the size of
the government, and the stability of wage bargaining is only a sufficient condition of
the local stability of our dynamic system. Therefore, involuntary unemployment can
be remedied only when goods demand is sufficiently large.
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1 Introduction
Involuntary unemployment has become a contentious subject of macroeconomics, and why
the labor market does not clear is a worrisome problem for theoretical analyses. Today,
so-called new Keynesian economists present an answer to this problem.1 According to the
new Keynesian school, involuntary unemployment is a consequence of wage rigidity. When
an economy suffers an exogenous shock, the market detaches itself from the equilibrium.
This disequilibrium is not solved immediately since prices are sticky. The analyses of
new Keynesian economists derive this stickiness from strict micro foundations, and this
approach has provided many implications for labor markets and business cycles. However,
new Keynesian theory overlooks an important macroeconomics concept, namely “effective
demand” in the words of Keynes (1936). In this school, the cause of involuntary unem-
ployment is not the shortage of effective labor demand, but rather disturbance factors
(e.g., price rigidity, information asymmetry) in the labor market.2 Such a fact implies that
this school does not include unemployment from effective demand in its theory, necessitat-
ing another tool with which to analyze involuntary unemployment and the labor market
equilibrium.
General disequilibrium economics (or non-Walrasian economics) is one solution to this
problem.3 To illustrate the principle of effective demand, this approach uses the concept
of “quantity constraints,” which works on the assumption that the quantity adjustment
is completed more quickly than the price adjustment.4 In disequilibrium economics, be-
cause transactions of goods, services, and labor are conducted at the prevailing prices,
the supplier (or the demander) may not deal with goods as much as it would like. Since
this constraint makes it revise the actual demand or supply in another market, a con-
straint in one market might cause another disequilibrium. Thus, this process can serve to
illustrate involuntary unemployment as the shortage of effective labor demand caused by
the goods market. Furthermore, this approach comprehends an equilibrium by the price
adjustment(Benassy, 1986). Therefore, we might derive an important implication for the
persistence of involuntary unemployment.
Malinvaud (1980) builds a disequilibrium macroeconomic model that consists of the
goods market, labor market, and capital market to analyze the persistence of involuntary
unemployment. He carries out a dynamic analysis of Keynesian unemployment,5 conclud-
ing that involuntary unemployment sustains and that full employment is not achieved
automatically. Since Malinvaud’s analysis is limited to the “Keynesian” regime, which is
characterized by excess supply in the goods market, Osumi (1992) extends his model by
taking regime switching into account. Osumi argues that the persistence of involuntary
unemployment depends on the size of potential excess demand in the goods market. He
also derives a business cycle among disequilibrium regimes and finds that convergence into
an equilibrium regime happens only when the goods market potentially clears. Although
the above-mentioned analyses draw suggestive conclusions about unemployment and the
1Mankiw (1990) summarizes some such analyses.
2Tobin (1993) insists that involuntary unemployment is caused by demand constraints rather than
nominal price rigidity.
3After Clower (1965) analyzed the rationed supply of goods, Barro and Grossman (1971, 1976), Benassy
(1975), Malinvaud (1977), and Muellbauer and Portes (1978) presented the general disequilibrium model.
Ito (1985), Benassy (1986), and Heijdra (2009, Chapter5) introduce studies of this approach. For dynamic
analyses, see Bo¨hm (1978), Ito (1980), and Honkapohja and Ito (1983).
4Leijonhufvud (1967) upholds this assumption.
5Specifically, he classifies involuntary unemployment into Keynesian unemployment, which is caused by
a constraint on goods supply, and classical unemployment, which is compatible with the excess demand of
goods. The latter is caused by insufficient productive capacity.
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equilibrium, these models are still too limited: labor supply is fixed and the labor trans-
action is independent of wages. In their models, single labor supply is constant and labor
demand is determined by actual output, meaning that unemployment is only a matter
of the output. Indeed, some workers are employed independently of wages in the short
term, even though some liquid workers (e.g., part-time workers, temporary employees) do
exist. To treat these contrary employment types simultaneously, we need a new tool for
the labor market, namely dual labor market theory.
Despite the plethora of jobs in the market, economists have typically built models that
have a single type of labor, which is sufficient to research macroeconomic topics. However,
the importance of several labor markets is rising. Against this background, Doeringer and
Piore (1985) introduce dual labor market theory, which contains two tiers of labor; primary
workers and secondary workers.6 Primary workers are highly skilled and they join a union
to enjoy high wages, high benefits, and employment security, while secondary ones do
not. Moreover, primary workers are protected by the union and thus their employment is
internal. By contrast, the market for secondary workers is competitive and thus external.
How does this duality work in macroeconomic models? The first focal point is the
effect on the income distribution among classes. Analyses of distributions usually focus on
workers and capitalists; however, some studies extend this class conflict and distinguish
workers into two types by introducing the middle class or manager class.7
The second focal point is employment forms or wage settings. According to dual labor
market theory, different employment forms exist simultaneously and labor markets affect
each other. For example, Saint-Paul (1996) argues that the duality of labor markets
could stabilize the economy. In his analysis, primary workers are a quasi-fixed factor of
production; however, the liquidity of secondary workers provides flexibility to production
and prices. Hence, the economy will be stabilized by such duality. Osumi (1999) also
researches several internal employment forms and examines how duality works in the
face of an exogenous shock. Although the duality of the labor market seems to reduce
the business cycle in these studies, the situations are limited. In other words, they see
stabilization by duality only when the economy suffers an exogenous shock.
Recent studies have analyzed how labor market duality works in an endogenous busi-
ness cycle model. For example, Flaschel and Greiner (2011) and Flaschel et al. (2012)
extend Goodwin (1967) and conclude that minimum and maximum wage regulations mit-
igate business cycles. Sasaki et al. (2013) presents a Kaleckian model with regular and
non-regular workers and studies how the wage gap and wage regulations affect wages and
employment at the steady state. These works explicitly illustrate the interaction between
the goods market and heterogeneous employment.
In this study, we build a general disequilibrium model with dual labor markets to
examine how stabilization works in a macroeconomic system and the persistence of unem-
ployment. We use Malinvaud’s (1980) model, reformulated by Osumi (1992), in which the
profitability of the firm determines the dynamics (or investment function). In our model,
wage bargaining also defines the dynamics, allowing us to show that the conflict between
the firm and workers affects the stability of macroeconomic dynamics.8
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a
6This duality is empirically analyzed by using a switching regression model in Dickens and Lang (1985),
Arthur and Chen (1991) and Ishiwaka (1999). Kalantzis et al. (2012) shows the existence of this duality
in the Lost Decade in Japan.
7See Lavoie (2009), Palley (2014), Tavani and Vasudevan (2014), Dutt et al. (2015), and Palley (2016).
Sasaki et al. (2013) and Sasaki (2015) use another distinction of workers: regular and non-regular.
8Charpe et al. (2015) also build a dynamic Keynesian model with dual labor markets; however, their
work focuses on investment and policy.
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disequilibrium model with two types of workers. In section 3, transactions in a static
economy are investigated. In our model, wages and the productive capacity of capital
characterize the economic regimes. We also see that duality expands an equilibrium regime
in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we formulate the dynamics of the variables and implement
a dynamic analysis. Since our model has a “medium-term” framework, the importance of
which is emphasized by Solow (1988), we analyze adjustments to productive capacity and
nominal prices in this section. We also induce a business cycle in the medium term and
analyze the steady states. Section 6 summarizes the analysis.
2 The model
In this section, we build a macroeconomic disequilibrium model based on Malinvaud
(1980), Osumi (1992), and Yoshikawa (1995, Chapter 5).
We suppose three types of economic agents: a representative firm, households, and the
government. These all deal with goods and labor in a closed economy.
We first present equations that express the transactions of goods. Let Y denote the
realized net output, which is aggregated. We assume that this is equal to the minimum of
effective demand and supply:
Y = min(Y d, Y s), (2.1)
where Y d and Y s are the aggregated effective demand and supply of goods, respectively.
The former includes consumption demand C, investment demand I, and government de-
mand G, meaning that
Y d = C + I +G. (2.2)
Effective supply is determined by existing capital and labor.
In the following, we formulate the activities of the three units and then specify the
system to analyze the short-term equilibria.
2.1 Households
We assume that there are homogeneous households that consume goods and supply labor.
First, their consumption is assumed to be the simplest Keynesian consumption func-
tion:
C = cY, 0 < c < 1, (2.3)
where c is the consumption propensity and constant. Although this formulation seems
crude, it is useful for analyzing the multiplier effect.9
Second, households supply two types of labor, namely primary workers L1 and sec-
ondary workers L2:
Ls1 = L¯1 = const, (2.4)
Ls2 = L
s
2
(
w2
w1
)
, Ls2
′ > 0, where wi =
Wi
P
. (2.5)
9The assumption of the Keynesian consumption function is compatible with disequilibrium models.
For instance, Clower (1965) argues that consumption depends on the realized income because of the dual
nature of the decision and Benassy (1986) derives this form from a household’s optimization.
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The subscript s is supply, Wi is the nominal wage of Li, and P is the price.
Since Ls1 is the supply of primary workers, we suppose that this is constant. Further,
their wages are determined by wage bargaining between the firm and union, and therefore
W1 is also constant in the short term. We suppose that the real primary wage w1 is
bounded or w1 ∈ [w1, w¯1]. On the contrary, secondary labor is additive for households,
and thus the supply of such workers depends on relative wages.
2.2 The firm
The representative firm produces single goods by using capital and labor and maximizes
its profit. We suppose that its production function is a fixed coefficient function:
Y = min(Y¯ , L), (2.6)
where Y¯ and L are the productive capacity of capital and labor, respectively.
We use a fixed proportion production function for two reasons. First, because our
analysis focuses on the short- and medium-term economy, we should abstract the substi-
tution between capital and labor. Second, this production function enables us to specify
the states of the two markets easily since we need only one equation to compare productive
capacity, labor supply, and aggregate demand.
The firm controls the employment of both types of workers to maximize its profit since
the capital stock is given in the short term. Thus, we should first analyze the relationship
between labor and profit.
2.2.1 Employment and profit maximization
The firm can employ two types of workers and adjust them to maximize real profit. Real
profit in the short term pi is
pi = Y − w1L1 − w2L2, (2.7)
where wi is the real wage of Li. To derive the effective labor output, we analyze the labor
allocation here.
First, we suppose that the labor output function can be expressed by φ, which is a
sufficiently smooth function of the two types of workers and
L = φ(L1, L2), φi > 0, φii < 0, φ12 = φ21 > 0, (2.8)
where φi =
∂φ
∂Li
, φii =
∂2φ
∂L2i
, i = 1, 2.
In the case with no output constraint, output is determined by L and profit maximiza-
tion shows that there is an optimum:
YM (w1, w2) ≡ arg max
Y=L
{Y − w1L1 − w2L2} subject to L1 ≤ L¯1. (2.9)
If the capital capacity is sufficient, then the firm desires this quantity. Hence, this is the
notional optimal output.
When the output quantity is confined, on the contrary, the firm solves the following
cost minimization problem:
min{w1L1 + w2L2} subject to φ(L1, L2) = Y. (2.10)
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The first-order condition is
w1
w2
=
φ1(L1, L2)
φ2(L1, L2)
. (2.11)
Figure 1 shows that the employment of both types of workers depends on output and
relative wages.
To begin the labor allocation analysis, we examine the secondary labor market. Eq.
(2.11) shows that effective demand for L2 is decreasing in w2 and increasing in Y and w1.
Hence, the secondary labor market can be expressed as shown in Figure 2. The market
clearing condition is
Ls2(w
∗
2;w1) = L
d
2(w
∗
2;w1, Y ). (2.12)
The wage w∗2 is increasing in Y and w1, while employment L∗2 is independent of w1 as
long as Eq. (2.11) holds. Therefore, the realized relative wage w1w∗2
is fixed when L1 ≤ L¯1.
This implies that effective primary labor demand depends only on output Y as long as we
consider secondary labor market clearing.
By contrast, the primary labor transaction is conducted at the given w1:
L1 = min
(
L¯1, L
d
1(Y )
)
, where φ
(
Ld1, L
∗
2(Y )
)
= Y. (2.13)
Primary labor demand is increasing in output, and thus an output quantity ensures full
employment for L1. We denote this as Yf :
L¯1 = L
d
1(Yf ). (2.14)
We now return to the notional optimum YM (w1, w
∗
2(w1)). This output level depends
only on w1 and is decreasing in w1, and we suppose
YM (w¯1) < Yf < YM (w1), (A1)
This inequality is intuitive: when they earn a low wage, employing all primary workers is
optimal; however, this is not the case for a too high wage. Eq. (A1) indicates
Yf = YM (w
∗
1), ∃w∗1 ∈ [w1, w¯1], (2.15)
according to the intermediate value theorem. At w∗1, full utilization for primary workers
is notionally optimal; hence, this wage rate can be seen as suitable.
Hence, the optimized labor output is
L = min(Y¯ , YM (w1)), (2.16)
and thus we have found the “effective” supply of goods:
Y s = min(Y¯ , L) = min(Y¯ , YM (w1)). (2.17)
Our effective supply differs slightly from that of other disequilibrium models. While it is
generally rationed by labor supply, this is not the case in this study. Indeed, in our model,
profit maximization alternatively confines supply to YM (w1).
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Figure 1: The isoquant curve for labor output
Figure 2: Secondary labor market at fixed Y
and w1 < w
′
1
2.2.2 Investment under uncertainty
The capital stock is fixed in the short term but adjustable by a net investment in the
medium term. Thus, the firm adjusts its capital stock as a net investment to maximize
real future profit; such an adjustment is independent of the optimization of real profit
pi since it is a dynamic problem. In this study, we formulate the investment following
Malinvaud (1980), considering the uncertainty of the goods market:10
I = α[min(Y d, YM (w1))− Y¯ ] + β(w∗1 − w1), α, β > 0. (2.18)
This investment function implies that the firm tends to expand its equipment both (1)
when its productive capacity is less than that desired and (2) when the rent from a primary
worker measured by w∗1 − w1 is large.
2.3 Government
The government only implements its fiscal policy: in our model, it only demands goods
G > 0 and is an exogenous variable. Note that G might be interpreted variously. As
this is the remainder of effective demand, it can include some autonomous goods demand
such as autonomous consumption and investment. By way of a simplification, these are
10We introduce his resolution. First, define a new variable:
Yˆ = min(Y d, YM (w1)).
The variable Yˆ can be considered to be the desired productive capacity and is a random variable.
Real profit pi ignores the capital cost. Considering the idle equipment cost, we define the future net
return R as follows:
R = pi − qmax(0, Y¯ − Yˆ ), q > 0.
The parameter q is the unit cost of idle equipment. The firm, which is risk-neutral, sets its productive
capacity to maximize the net expected return in the future E[R], meaning that the optimization problem
in dynamics (P ) is
max
Y¯
E[R]. (P)
In the linear economy, the solution for (P ) shows the first term of Eq. (2.18).
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gathered as G herein, which represents the scale of the intervention of the government.
The comparative statics of G are used to assess whether the government is large or limited.
2.4 Disequilibrium system in the short term
According to the above formulations, we have gained the static macroeconomic system:
Y = min(Y d, Y¯ , YM (w1)), (2.19a)
Y d = C + I +G, (2.19b)
C = cY, (2.19c)
I = α[min(Y d, YM (w1))− Y¯ ] + β(w∗1 − w1), (2.19d)
L1 = min
(
L¯1, L
d
1(Y,w1)
)
, (2.19e)
L2 = L
s
2(w
∗
2;w1) = L
d
2(w
∗
2;w1, Y ), (2.19f)
w2 = w
∗
2(Y,w1), (2.19g)
Y¯ = const, (2.19h)
w1 = const. (2.19i)
There are nine independent equations and nine endogenous variables (Y , Y d, Y¯ , C, I, L1,
L2, w1, w2), meaning that the system is closed. In the last two equations, we suppose that
two variables, Y¯ and w1, are constant in the short term. These variables characterize the
economy in each time period.
3 Transactions in the short term
We attained the static disequilibrium system in the preceding section. In this section,
we distinguish economic regimes by using the pair of variables w1 and Y¯ . Our economic
model has three disequilibrium regimes and two equilibrium regimes, which are displayed
as domains on the Y¯ –w1 plane.
We first distinguish which variable determines the realized output.
1. Y = Y d
The cases Y d ≤ Y¯ ≤ YM and Y d ≤ YM ≤ Y¯ are necessary and sufficient for the
condition Y = Y d. Since output is determined by effective demand, effective demand
Y d∗ has a multiplier effect here:
Y d∗ =
1
k
[β(w∗1 − w1) +G− αY¯ ], where k = 1− c− α (3.1)
and the condition of Y = Y d is that Y d∗ ≤ YM and Y d∗ ≤ Y¯ . We assume 0 < k < 1,
which is the stability condition of the multiplier process.
2. Y = Y¯
In this case, aggregate demand Y d changes depending on the other variables:
Y d = 11−α [β(w
∗
1 − w1) +G+ (c− α)Y¯ ] if Y¯ ≤ Y d ≤ YM , (3.2)
Y d = β(w∗1 − w1) +G+ (c− α)Y¯ + αYM if Y¯ ≤ YM ≤ Y d, (3.3)
and the region Y = Y¯ is the union of the regions Y¯ ≤ Y d ≤ YM and Y¯ ≤ YM ≤ Y d.
We assume c − α > 0, which implies that effective demand increases as productive
capacity rises when capacity is low.
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3. Y = YM
In this case, Y d has a unique form:
Y d = β(w∗1 − w1) +G− αY¯ + (c+ α)YM , (3.4)
and we should illustrate the region of the intersection YM ≤ Y d and YM ≤ Y¯ as the
region Y = YM .
The three cases distinguished to determine the realized output are shown as regions in
Figure 3.11 Two variables are “effective” to determine the realized output on the boundary
lines between two regions. The point EM means Y d = Y¯ = YM (w1)(= Y ). On the right
side of the figure, there exists excess supply for goods. Note that the exogenous variable
G shifts the boundary lines up and down. Here, we assume the following equation:
β + kY ′M (w1) > 0, ∀w1 ∈ [w1, w¯1]. (A2)
This inequality means that the rise in primary wages restrains investment. Under this
assumption, the expansion of G, which means that effective demand expands, enlarges the
region of Y s < Y d, as shown by Osumi (1992).
Figure 3: Determinants of output on the Y¯ –w1 plane
Furthermore, aggregate demand Y d changes depending on the magnitude of the cor-
relations among Y d, Y¯ , and YM (w1) because the multiplier process working in the model
differs according to effective supply and demand.
Next, we analyze the equilibrium or disequilibrium regimes in the static system. We
formulate the conditions of each regime and depict each as a region on the Y¯ –w1 plane.
3.1 Disequilibrium regimes
3.1.1 Keynesian unemployment
In this regime, the realized output is rationed by aggregate demand and primary workers
are not completely employed. In other words, involuntary unemployment occurs because of
the lack of effective demand in the goods market. This disequilibrium regime is expressed
by the following equation:
Y = Y d < Yf . (3.5)
11This figure is the same as the regime dividing in Osumi (1992), which treats a single labor.
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This condition is the correlation between w1 and Y¯ , and it implies that the region is a
subset of the region Y = Y d.
3.1.2 Classical unemployment
In the classical unemployment regime, involuntary unemployment occurs even though
excess goods demand claims more production. In other words, excess demand exists in
the goods market and excess supply exists in the primary labor market, meaning that
Y = Y s < Yf . (3.6)
3.1.3 Repressed inflation
In this regime, the economy has excess labor demand and excess goods demand. Hence,
the firm would no longer employ more workers despite it being physically possible. The
repressed inflation region is the interior of the region Y = YM :
Yf ≤ Y = YM (w1) < Y d, Y¯ . (3.7)
3.2 Equilibrium regimes
We call the states in which primary workers are completely employed and the goods market
is rationed by either productive capacity or demand, the “equilibrium.” Therefore, the
condition of the equilibrium regime is
Yf ≤ min(Y d, Y¯ ) ≤ YM (w1). (3.8)
This condition implies that the equilibrium region is the one of the union set of the closures
of the subsets of Y = Y d and Y = Y¯ .
In the equilibrium regime, the firm employs all primary workers and operates to max-
imize profit under its physical constraints (i.e., capital stock and goods demand).
Considering the relevance to Walrasian economics, we divide this regime into two:
the full equilibrium, which is the same as the general equilibrium in standard Walrasian
economics, and the quasi-equilibrium, in which the goods market does not clear.
3.2.1 Full equilibrium
We name the state in which both markets clear as the “full equilibrium.” The condition
is
Yf ≤ Y d = Y s. (3.9)
In this regime, productive capacity is equal to goods demand and labor markets also clear;
thus, the regime is equivalent to the general equilibrium in Walrasian economics.12
Indeed, this full equilibrium is incompatible with full utilization when G is too large:
if potential aggregate demand is larger than YM (w
∗
1), then excess capacity happens in the
full equilibrium. To see that, define wM1 as the wage at point E
M . Then, the following
equation holds:
1
k′
G ⋛ YM (w∗1) ⇐⇒ wM1 ⋛ w∗1, (3.10)
12We do not call this equilibrium regime the Walrasian equilibrium since we omit the dynamic process
here. In this study, the Walrasian equilibrium is defined as the steady state, which is the full equilibrium.
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where k′ = 1− c. 1k′G in the first comparison could be called potential aggregate demand
or aggregate demand at the steady state, since it is attained when I = 0 and Y = Y d∗.
As wM1 is the minimum wage that satisfies Y
d = Y¯ , the full equilibrium does not include
full utilization when wM1 > w
∗
1.
3.2.2 Quasi-equilibrium
The quasi-equilibrium regime is the remainder of the equilibrium regime with the full
equilibrium removed. The condition is
Yf ≤ Y, Y d ̸= Y s. (3.11)
3.3 Dividing the economy into regimes
From the above arguments, we can display these regimes on the Y¯ –w1 plane, as shown in
Figure 4. The left side is the case with small G and the right one is the case with large
G.
1
k′G < YM (w
∗
1)
1
k′G > YM (w
∗
1)
Figure 4: Dividing the regimes on the Y¯ –w1 plane
This plane is confined to the upper limit of w1 or w¯1, but this is unimportant. Thus,
we suppose that w¯1 is sufficiently large to omit its limitation.
From Figure 4, we can characterize each regime. First, the Keynesian unemployment
regime has high wages and abundant productive capacity. In this regime, the low profit
rate and plentiful capital stock restrain investment, and the low effective demand for goods
causes the involuntary unemployment of primary workers.
Second, the classical unemployment regime has low productive capacity. In this regime,
the low capital stock reduces labor demand and some workers would not be hired even if
wages are low.
Third, the repressed inflation regime has low wages and large productive capacity. The
substitution of workers promotes the employment of primary workers because of their low
wages. Moreover, the low wage rate (high profit rate) accelerates investment. Therefore,
effective demand rises and the capital stock is accumulated excessively. In this regime,
the firm maximizes its notional profit.
Finally, the equilibrium region lies around repressed inflation. This fact implies that
this regime is characterized by a moderate wage and an adequate capital stock, which
11
seems reasonable. In particular, when 1k′G ̸= YM (w∗1), the full equilibrium regime is
expressed as the curve.13
We should note that a too high wage (w1 > w
∗
1) causes unemployment, whereas a
fall in wages does not always solve unemployment: if capital is insufficient, wage lowering
brings about the classical unemployment regime because unemployment is not a problem
for the labor market, but rather a problem for the whole economy.
For the competitive statics, we should compare the two figures. As G becomes large
or the government expands, the boundary lines shift upward, indicating that Keynesian
unemployment shrinks, while classical unemployment expands. Further, the equilibrium
and repressed inflation, which show full employment, also expand. This finding implies
that a large government solves unemployment with low goods demand.
4 Preparation for the dynamic analysis
In this section, we formulate the dynamics of two variables, w1 and Y¯ , which were supposed
to be constant in the short term.
4.1 Investment and productive capacity
Net investment I has a dual effect: it is a component of effective demand in the short
term, while it adjusts the capital stock in the medium term. Eq. (2.18) indicates that the
dynamics of capital productivity Y¯ are expressed as the following equation:
˙¯Y = I = α[min(Y d, YM (w1))− Y¯ ] + β(w∗1 − w1), (4.1)
where t is time and X˙ ≡ dXdt is the dynamics of a time variable X(t).
4.2 Wage bargaining and nominal wage dynamics
To formulate the dynamics of real wages w1, we consider the wage bargaining of nominal
wage W1 because the firm and primary workers are supposed to bargain with the price as
given. In addition, such bargaining determines only the wage since we adopt the “right
to manage” model for the primary labor market: employment is given when bargaining is
conducted. Considering our assumptions, we adopt static arguments such as McDonald
and Solow (1985) to assess the wage dynamics.
The factors that affect this wage bargaining include the payoffs of the two economic
units (the firm and primary workers) and relative bargaining power of the union, meaning
that
W˙1
W1
=
W˙1
W1
(σ,w2, w
∗
1),
∂
∂σ
(
W˙1
W1
)
> 0,
∂
∂w2
(
W˙1
W1
)
> 0,
∂
∂w∗1
(
W˙1
W1
)
> 0, (4.2)
and σ is the relative bargaining power of the union.14 Then, we analyze each variable and
build a simple equation.
13The line of the full equilibrium is peculiar to our model: conventional disequilibrium models depict
the full equilibrium as a point on a plane. On the contrary, the present study supposes the equilibrium
of the secondary labor market and therefore output can represent a variable number under the complete
employment of L1. The segment implies that the general equilibrium might not have uniqueness in a static
system. This indeterminacy would be solved in a dynamic analysis.
14The background of this equation is presented in Appendix A.
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Suppose that σ depends on the number of union members; then, the variable is affected
by the unemployment rate u:
σ = σ(u), σ′ < 0 where u =
L¯1 − L1
L¯1
. (4.3)
Employment for L1 expands as output increases as long as Y < Yf ; therefore, we rearrange
the equation above:
σ = σ(Y ), σ′
{
> 0 if Y < Yf
= 0 if Y ≥ Yf .
(4.4)
The wages of secondary workers w2 are determined by output Y in each time period,
which is an increasing function of L2:
w2 = w
∗
2(Y ), w
∗
2
′ > 0 (4.5)
These two variables are the factors that affect the attitude of workers. The equations
above indicate that the wage w1 aims to rise when the realized output Y is large.
Finally, we assume that the wage rate desired by the firm w∗1 is the objective rate in
the medium term, which implies that the firm would prefer not to diverge from it.
The discussions above revise the formulation of Eq. (4.2):
W˙1
W1
=
W˙1
W1
(σ(Y ), w2(Y ), w
∗
1)
=
W˙1
W1
(Y,w∗1),
∂
∂Y
(
W˙1
W1
)
> 0,
∂
∂w∗1
(
W˙1
W1
)
> 0. (4.6)
We use a linear dynamic function for simplification:
W˙1
W1
= ω1 [Y − Yf ] + ω2(w∗1 − w1), ω1, ω2 > 0, (4.7)
where ωi is constant. The first term on the right side indicates that employment raises
workers’ bargaining power and that the wage rises after they are completely employed.15
The second term shows that the firm wants the desired wage rate w∗1 and bargains to
achieve it.
4.3 Price dynamics in the goods market
The price of goods P changes according to a disequilibrium in the goods market. That is,
we suppose that a Walrasian adjustment process exists in the goods market:
P˙
P
= ρ(Y d − Y s), ρ > 0, (4.8)
where ρ is the adjustment speed. Therefore, we can now formulate the dynamics of the
real wage w1:
w˙1
w1
=
W˙1
W1
− P˙
P
= ω1(Y − Yf ) + ω2(w∗1 − w1)− ρ(Y d − Y s). (4.9)
15Goodwin (1967) uses a similar equation: his wage dynamics also depend on the present level of
employment. Considering the proportional production function, moreover, we can say that our formulation
concurs with that of Dutt (1992) since the employment rate and output have a positive correlation.
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Although this is a linear function, the real wage dynamics are somewhat complicated:
they depend on the realized output and effective supply and demand, and thus they differ
in each regime.
We now have a macroeconomic system in the medium term, which consists of Eqs.
(2.19a)–(2.19g) from Section 2 as well as Eqs. (4.1) and (4.9) from this section. In the
next section, we analyze the stability and cycles in this dynamic system.
5 Dynamic analysis
We formulated the dynamics of the two variables Y¯ and w1 in Section 4. In this section,
we use them to analyze the dynamics of our disequilibrium model.
We first examine the dynamics of these two variables with Eqs. (4.1) and (4.9) and
then analyze the dynamics of our model by using phase diagrams.
5.1 Dynamics of the two variables
Productive capacity is adjusted along with Eq. (4.1) in the medium term. This equation
includes effective demand Y d and differs in each regime.
1
k′G < YM (w
∗
1)
1
k′G > YM (w
∗
1)
Figure 5: The dynamics of Y¯
To create a phase diagram, we illustrate the set of points that fulfills ˙¯Y = 0 on the
Y¯ –w1 plane (see Figure 5). That is downward-sloping, and productive capacity is adjusted
to this nullcline.16
The scale of G transforms this nullcline and we present two cases: 1k′G > YM (w
∗
1) and
1
k′G < YM (w
∗
1). In the former, potential aggregate demand is sufficient for notional profit
maximization. This is a profitable case for the firm. Capital equipment reduces when
Y = Y d and is adjusted to an excess-demand point when w1 = w
∗
1. In the latter, the line
˙¯Y = 0 crosses the region Y = Y d and Y¯ is adjusted to the equilibrium of the goods market
when w1 = w
∗
1.
The diagrams show that if effective goods demand is high, the firm does not need to
invest as much to create demand.
The dynamics of w1, or the wages of primary workers, are shown in Eq. (4.9). This
equation also includes the variables that are effective, which differ by regime. Figure 6
shows the w˙1–nullclines, where w1 rises on the right side of the curve and falls on the
16We can confirm that ∂
∂Y¯
˙¯Y < 0 for any coordinates.
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opposite side. This diagram indicates that abundant capital equipment is profitable for
workers during wage bargaining; thus, the nominal wage aims to rise and large supply in
the goods market aims to lower prices.
∂
∂w1
(
w˙1
w1
)
< 0(stable) ∂∂w1
(
w˙1
w1
)
> 0(unstable)
Figure 6: The dynamics of w1
The scale of G changes this diagram: as G rises, the curve expands to the right side
because high effective demand in the goods market restrains prices and a price drop raises
the real wage. Note that when 1k′G = YM (w
∗
1), or the goods market is potentially in
equilibrium, the isocline w˙1 = 0 crosses E
M .
We divide the dynamics of w1 into two cases relating to wage adjustment stability.
17
We should see the sign of
∂
∂w1
(
w˙1
w1
)
. (5.1)
If this is negative, the wage dynamics are stable. In other words, wages have a centripetal
force if you ignore the goods market.
5.2 Macroeconomic dynamics: cycles and convergences
We can now depict the phase diagrams. Our dynamics differ in the scale of G and the
stability of wage bargaining; concerning the latter, we focus on the stable case.
To see the convergence, we define the steady state as that in which both our subjective
variables are constant: on the Y¯ –w1 plane, the steady state is expressed as the intersection
between ˙¯Y = 0 and w˙1 = 0.
Figure 7 illustrates the phase diagrams with two cases: small G (left) and large G
(right). These diagrams show that our model has a counterclockwise cycle : excess capacity
reduces investment, which then also reduces effective demand in the goods market. Then,
the realized output decreases and the price rises, which is disadvantageous for workers as
real wages fall. The low wage expands profit and thus the firm invests to produce more,
rising wages again because of the large output.
The business cycle is at the steady state and sometimes falls into dysfunction; as a
consequence, output reduces to zero. This failure of wages occurs even if wage bargaining
is stable.
17The isoclines in Figure 6 are not general: we can illustrate another form when the magnitude relation
among the parameters changes. We adopt the simple and typical case in this study (see Appendix B).
15
1
k′G < YM (w
∗
1)
1
k′G > YM (w
∗
1)
Figure 7: Phase diagrams with stable wage bargaining
Our dynamic system has a unique steady state in each case. In the small G case, we
call it SS1. SS1 is in the domains Y s < Y d and w1 > w
∗
1, which suggests that the cycle
converges toward the classical unemployment regime. Low goods demand weakens the
firm, so the wage rises and low profitability restrains investment.
On the contrary, the economy with large G reaches the steady state in the domains
Y = YM and w1 < w
∗
1, or in the repressed inflation regime. We call this SS2. In
this scenario, the firm is aggressive in its wage bargaining since there is abundant goods
demand and notional profit maximization is achieved.
Note that the equilibrium regime is unstable in these cases: bargaining and capital
adjustment have a centrifugal force from the equilibrium unless notional goods supply and
potential goods demand coincide.
5.2.1 Walrasian equilibrium
As long as 1k′G ̸= YM (w∗1), the steady state is in a disequilibrium regime, as shown above.
However, we attain the steady state in an equilibrium regime when G is adequate:
1
k′
G = YM (w
∗
1). (5.2)
Under this condition, the cycle converges toward the full equilibrium regime. We
call this steady state the Walrasian equilibrium, which achieves the market equilibriums,
notional profit maximization, and full utilization for capital capacity.
5.2.2 Wage stability and macroeconomic stability
From the above analysis, we can conclude that the scale of G or demand of the government
affects the steady state. On the contrary, the stability of wage bargaining affects the
stability or cycle of the economy. The important result is this:
Proposition. If wage bargaining is stable, the steady state is locally stable.
Proof. At the steady state, the Jacobian matrix of our dynamic system is as follows:
J =
(−α j12
j21
∂
∂w1
(
w˙1
w1
)) , where j12 < 0, j21 ≥ 0. (5.3)
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Figure 8: Walrasian equilibrium
If wage bargaining is stable, the diagonal elements are both negative and thus
detJ > 0 and trJ < 0.
This condition shows that the steady state is locally asymptotically stable in each regime.
Since the dynamic equations are continuous on every boundary, the local stability in
each regime indicates that our dynamic system is locally stable, as proved by Eckalbar
(1980).
The proposition claims that wage bargaining affects the stability of the economy,
whereas global stability is not ensured: even if wage bargaining is stable, the cycle might
diverge from the steady state because of the disequilibrium in the goods market. This
partial effect of bargaining stability shows that the interconnection between markets and
adjustment process are important factors in economic stability.
Figure 9 shows the unstable case. The cycle is similar to that in the stable case, but
it often diverges.
Figure 9: The phase diagram with unstable wage bargaining and 1k′G < YM (w
∗
1)
17
5.2.3 Implications for government policy
As we have seen, the size of government (or the size of fiscal policy) G affects the steady
states. In this subsection, we evaluate this and derive further policy implications.
First, the size of G determines the regime and wage at the steady state. When bar-
gaining is stable, the isocline w˙1 = 0 is upward-sloping and large G lowers this curve as
well as ˙¯Y = 0. Therefore, the wage at the steady state is decreasing in G. This shift
also changes the regime of the steady state. As we have seen, small G induces classical
unemployment. Hence, we can conclude that a large government ensures full employment
but that this employment is accompanied with low wages.
When bargaining is unstable, on the contrary, the evaluation of G is complicated: as
G changes, the wage at the steady state changes non-monotonically. In this case, there is
an optimal value for G to maximize the wage.
In our model, the government can implement another policy: wage regulation. The
primary wage w1 has an effective range or [w1, w¯1]. Because this is exogenous, the govern-
ment can impose some regulation on this range. Obviously, suitable regulation mitigates
the business cycle, since this cycle is about the primary wage.18 As the wage at the steady
states changes with the size of G, if the government implements a large fiscal policy, the
minimum wage regulation should not be strict (or, rather, a maximum wage regulation is
needed).
Figure 10: A mitigated cycle with a suitable minimum wage regulation wˆ1
6 Conclusion
In this study, we analyzed the effect of dual labor markets on the disequilibrium macroe-
conomic model. We conclude our analysis as follows:
1. A substitutable dual labor force generates equilibrium regions (full equilibrium and
quasi-equilibrium) among the disequilibrium regions, and thus the economy can stay
in an equilibrium region comparatively easily in the short term.
2. In the medium term, a business cycle about productive capacity and wages occurs
and sometimes the economy converges to the steady state.
18This result is the same as Flaschel and Greiner (2011).
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3. The steady states differ in economic characteristics; when the government is suffi-
ciently large, involuntary unemployment is solved in the medium term.
4. The equilibrium regime is unstable when the goods market is not potentially in
equilibrium.
These findings imply that a dual labor market stabilizes the economy in the short term
but that such stability is subtle in the medium term. Keynesian unemployment turns into
another disequilibrium regime, and low goods demand induces persistent unemployment.
Our analysis evaluated the effect of duality on the economic model throughout and is
limited: such duality does not allow us to regard the Walrasian equilibrium as given,
since the equilibrium is hardly stable. Theoretically, this limited function of the duality
comes from the staticity of equilibrium theory. We suppose an excessively high adjustment
speed for the secondary labor market, and this characteristic does not contribute to the
dynamics, implying that the disequilibrium plays a substantial role in economic dynamics
or business cycles.
In addition, as we omit the distribution here, the stability effect of the labor market
is further doubtful. Liquid employment sometimes implies unstable employment, mean-
ing that each wage would differ in its distribution effect. This fact implies that labor
substitution from primary to secondary might lower goods consumption and this under-
consumption might cause further unemployment. The investigation of this point remains
a future research issue.
Finally, our model calls for more strict settings for dual labor markets. As Saint-
Paul (1996) insists, protection for primary workers such as the firing cost is an important
aspect of this labor market model. Since the firm in our model can hire and fire both
types of workers freely, this characteristic might derive another conclusion. In this re-
spect, our analysis should aid further studies of dual labor market theory and involuntary
unemployment.
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A Nash bargaining and the dynamics of W1
Here, we solve a Nash bargaining problem and derive Eq. (4.2). The bargaining on L1 is
a right-to-manage model in the present study. Hence, we can control only the variable W1
to solve the following problem:
max
W1
[u(W1)− u(W2)]σ [Γ(W ∗1 −W1)]1−σ , (A.1)
where u is a payoff function of the union and u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, while Γ is the payoff function
of the firm and we assume Γ′ > 0,Γ′′ ≤ 0. σ ∈ (0, 1) is the relative bargaining power of
the union. The first-order condition is
σ
du
dW1
Γ− (1− σ)(u1 − u2)Γ′ = 0, (A.2)
where u1−u2 = u(W1)−u(W2). By using the total difference, we can see the relationship
among the variables:{
σ
[
u′′Γ− u′Γ′]− (1− σ) [−Γ′′(u1 − u2) + Γ′u′]} dW1 − [(1− σ)Γ′u′]dW2
+
{
u′Γ + Γ′(u1 − u2)
}
dσ +
{
σu′Γ′ − (1− σ)(u1 − u2)
}
dW ∗1 = 0.
(A.3)
Therefore, it can be said that
dW1
dW2
> 0,
dW1
dσ
> 0,
dW1
dW ∗1
> 0. (A.4)
Recall that the price is constant in each time period; therefore, we can rewrite nominal
wages as real ones. Furthermore, the wages in each time period are given and thus the
direction of the dynamics of w1 is the same as the equation above:
dW˙1
dw2
> 0,
dW˙1
dσ
> 0,
dW˙1
dw∗1
> 0. (A.5)
B Depicting the isocline w˙1 = 0
To complete the phase diagrams, we should know the form of the isocline w˙1 = 0 or
w˙1–nullcline. For the former, note that the size of G affects this equation and we should
consider the reference point 1k′G = YM (w
∗
1) = Yf . If this condition holds, the nullcline
crosses the point EM on the Y¯ –w1 plane:
w˙1
w1
= ω1 (Y − Yf ) + ω2(w∗1 − wM1 )− ρ(Y d − Y s) = 0, (B.1)
since all three terms in the middle one become zero at EM under this condition. Next, we
analyze five cases for the dynamics since the dynamic equation includes Y , Y d, and Y s.
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By dividing the cases, we expand it as follows:
w˙1
w1A
=
βω1 + kω2 − βρ
k
(w∗1 − w1) +
ω1 − ρ
k
G+
−αω1 + k′ρ
k
Y¯ − ω1Yf (B.2a)
w˙1
w1B
=
βω1 + kω2 − βρ
k
(w∗1 − w1) +
ω1 − ρ
k
G+
−αω1 + αρ
k
Y¯ + ρYM (w1)− ω1Yf
(B.2b)
w˙1
w1C
=
(1− α)ω2 − βρ
1− α (w
∗
1 − w1)−
ρ
1− αG+
(1− α)ω1 + k′ρ
1− α Y¯ − ω1Yf (B.2c)
w˙1
w1D
= (ω2 − βρ)(w∗1 − w1)− ρG+ (ω1 + (k′ + α)ρ)Y¯ − αρYM (w1)− ω1Yf (B.2d)
w˙1
w1E
= (ω2 − βρ)(w∗1 − w1)− ρG+ αρY¯ − (ω1 + kρ)YM (w1)− ω1Yf , (B.2e)
where the subscripts correspond to the regions in Figure 11. The graphs of w˙1 = 0 are
a compound of the line w1 = 0 and the curves derived by letting the right sides of the
equations above be zero. Since w1 is positive, we ignore the former.
Figure 11: Region dividing and crossing points
By using the total differentials, we can check the direction of w1, which is not on the
curve w˙1 = 0, the slope of the curve, and the shifts when G changes. About the last one,
we assume the following condition for simplification:
ω1 < ρ, (A4)
which implies that the friction of the speed of bargaining is smaller than the whole ad-
justment speed of the goods market. Under this assumption, the sign of dw1dG and slopes
of the nullcline are common in all regions. Furthermore, we assume that the slope of the
curve is always positive or negative.
To depict the curve, we should know whether the set w˙1 = 0 is valid in each region.
For instance, can the right side of Eq. (B.2a) be zero in region A? Therefore, we check
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the crossing points of the region boundaries and curves w˙1 = 0.
19 Each region has two
boundaries and if both the crossing points on them are valid, the curve w˙1 = 0 crosses the
region. In other words, if P1 and P2 satisfy the validity condition, then the isocline w˙1 = 0
emerges in region A. As the curve crosses EM when 1k′G = YM (w
∗
1) and the boundaries
shift as G changes, we should know the relationship between the wage at the crossing
point Pi or w
i
1 and the reference wage w
M
1 . In other words, we should know the signs of
dwi1
dG
− dw
M
1
dG
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. (B.3)
If this is positive, the crossing point rises along the boundary relative to EM as G grows.
Therefore, we can check which crossing point is valid in the cases 1k′G < YM (w
∗
1) and
1
k′G > YM (w
∗
1).
19The curves w˙1 = 0 are continuous on all the crossing points since the minimum function of continuous
functions is explicitly continuous.
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